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Healthcare services, the EU single market and beyond: meeting local needs in an open economy—
how much market or how little market? 
Arianna Andreangeli 
 
Abstract 
This paper considers the impact of the choices made by the member states in designing the 
institutional and regulatory concerning taxpayer-funded health services on the applicability of the 
EU single market and competition rules and on the public procurement legal regime.  It will focus on 
the different approaches adopted in the United Kingdom in England and Wales as opposed to 
Scotland.  The paper will conclude by looking at some of the issues that could arise from the 
implementation of common commercial policy initiatives undertaken by the Union: taking in 
consideration the ongoing negotiation of the EU/US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), it will consider whether liberalising trade in services may imperil the solidarity-based nature 
of healthcare that is typical of the EU member states. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The question of how publicly funded healthcare services should be provided has been one of the 
crunch points in the legal, political and economic debate since the inception of the modern welfare 
states.  Should these economic activities be the exclusive purvey of public agencies, so as to reach all 
affected individuals free at the point of need? Or can an element of “private enterprise 
participation” be allowed?  The realisation of the internal market within the European Union, with 
its emphasis on market access and competition, has added a further dimension to these debates: 
although the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) allows to the member states a 
significant margin of discretion in choosing how to design the frameworks for publicly funded 
healthcare provision, it regards these services as falling within the scope of the single market 
principles.  Against this background, the limited “supporting and coordinating” competence that the 
Union enjoys in this area must be seen as the tool through which the EU institutions can prevent the 
exercise of state powers from unduly encroaching upon the good functioning of the internal market. 
         Accordingly, a complex picture emerges when it comes to examining the position of these 
public services in the context of the EU treaties: on the one hand, there is a concern for allowing the 
member states, as best placed to assess the healthcare needs of their populations, to determine 
how these services should be provided to individual users, according to local demands for patients’ 
care and public health.  On the other hand, the single market principles enshrined in the TFEU place 
limits on this discretion to ensure the respect of free movement of persons and services’ rules, albeit 
within the framework of public policy interests that characterise, inter alia, public health provision. 
        The goal of this paper is to consider some of the questions arising from the impact of the 
choices made by the member states in designing the institutional frameworks for and in regulating 
                                                          
 Lecturer in competition law, Edinburgh Law School, University of Edinburgh.  An earlier draft of this paper 
was presented at the European Union Studies Association conference in March 2015; heartfelt thanks are also 
owed to the Scottish Parliament European and External Relations Committee, to which the author gave 
evidence on these themes in November 2014, for providing feedback and encouragement to work on these 
issues.  The author is also grateful to Prof Luigi Daniele, of the University of Rome II-Tor Vergata, and to Prof 
Barry Rodger, of the School of Law at the University of Strathclyde, for their comments.  The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
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the provision of taxpayer-funded health services on the applicability of these single market 
principles, of the competition rules and on the public procurement legal regime.  In this context, the 
different approaches adopted in the United Kingdom for the functioning of the National Health 
Service (NHS) in England and Wales as opposed to Scotland will be examined.  Toward the end, the 
paper will also briefly address some of the issues that could arise from the implementation of 
common commercial policy initiatives undertaken by the Union as an international actor: taking in 
consideration the ongoing negotiation of the EU/US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), it will be examined whether liberalising trade in services with undertakings affiliated to a non-
member country may actually imperil the solidarity-based nature of healthcare that is typical of the 
EU member states. 
         It will be argued that maintaining an effective provision of healthcare services funded by 
general taxation and free at the point of need remains a central aspect to the mission of European 
welfare states, so as to achieve, as also mandated by the TFEU, high levels of public health: for this 
purpose, it will be shown that the Treaty itself both safeguards, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, the power of appreciation of individual member states as they seek to fulfil the 
demands of their own population and at the same time contain the scope of this discretion to 
ensure that domestic measures do not hamper the good functioning of the internal market.  It will 
be illustrated that the TFEU allows for derogations from the reach of the free movement principles 
for reasons of public policy, albeit in the respect of requirements of proportionality and necessity, as 
well as allowing the provision of services according to mutuality principles to “escape” from the 
scope of application of the competition rules.  It will also be shown that the respect for the same 
principle of subsidiarity has justified the emergence of a “light touch regime” for public contracts 
concerning “essential services to the person”. 
          It will be concluded that while the concerns for the future of the provision of taxpayer funded 
healthcare services “free at the point of need” are certainly justified, also in light of broader societal 
issues, such as the growth of an ageing population and the correspondingly limited financial 
resources, the reach of the EU single market rules or indeed the current developments in the field of 
common commercial policy should not be regarded as a threat to the discretionary powers that the 
member states enjoy in this area.  It will be argued that whether to “open up” publicly funded 
healthcare provision to the market or, on the contrary, to maintain it “within public hands” is a 
choice that remains with the member states: thus, save for a Treaty amendment for that specific 
purpose, the EU, on its part, cannot in any way force the “privatisation” of these services, whether 
through internal measures or action on the international plain. 
 
2. Public health care and the Single Market: between encouraging free movement and ensuring the 
survival of domestic populations… 
 
2.1. Healthcare provision and the single market: a “special type” of services? 
 
Health care services funded by the taxpayer and provided “free at the point of need” to individual 
patients are a mainstay of the EU member states, being regarded as "the quintessential public 
service” which should be guided by “principles of equal access and equal treatment of patients”.1  
On this point, it should be noted that the TFEU lists the objective of attaining a high level of 
protection of human health across the Union as one of the Union’s objectives.2  The CJEU has 
indicated that while in principle they remain subject to the free movement rules,3  these services 
were of a “sensitive nature” 4 and that consequently, absent any harmonisation in this field, member 
                                                          
1 Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law, 2005: Oxford, OUP, p. 7; see also p. 9. 
2 See e.g. Declaration of the Contracting Parties on Article 168(4) TFEU, attached to the TFEU and agreed at the 
Lisbon Inter-Governmental Conference. 
3 See e.g. Opinion 1/2008, Re: GATS, [2009] ECR I-11129, para. 130, 132-134. 
4 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, case 159/90, SPUC v Grogan, [1991] ECR I-4685, para. 18. 
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states should be recognised the power to assess the demands of public health within their 
jurisdictions and on that basis determine the entitlement to healthcare benefits for individuals as 
well as the way in which these services should be provided and financed.5   
          Thus, in Kohll the CJEU accepted that, in principle, a concern for “seriously undermining the 
financial balance of a social security system”6 and in particular for “maintaining a balanced medical 
and hospital service open to all”7 could provide a justification for limiting the reach of that freedom.     
However, it took the view that any limitations and conditions could only be justified in light of the 
requirements of the Treaty if they were “(…) necessary to provide a balanced medical and hospital 
service accessible to all (…)”: the Member States could establish rules designed to govern the 
reimbursement of medical expenses for services obtained by the patient in a different member state 
with a view to securing "(...) treatment capacity or medical competence on national territory” and, 
as a result, to protecting the health and survival of their populations.8   Nonetheless, the CJEU took 
the view that since these rules could discourage individuals from seeking medical care elsewhere in 
the internal market,9 they could only be justified if they were appropriate to attaining goals of public 
policy such as, inter alia, guaranteeing "sufficient and permanent access to a range of high quality 
treatment” and to “prevent (…) any wastage of financial, technical and human resources”.10  They 
should also have been “(…) based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in 
advance" and applied in a non-arbitrary manner.11 
         It is further noted that the scope of that discretion and the choices made by the competent 
national authorities in the area of public healthcare provision have a significant impact on the scope 
of application of the EU competition rules.  While the remit of this contribution does not allow for 
any in-depth consideration of general issues arising from the design of healthcare systems, it is 
necessary to note that one of the key principles according to which these services are provided is the 
principle of mutuality: thus, the EU Court of Justice held in the Poucet preliminary ruling12 that 
providing social security or sickness benefits would not represent an “economic activity” for the 
purpose of applying, inter alia, Article 102 TFEU if this occurred on the basis of purely solidarity 
based criteria.13 In the EU Court’s view, providing that, the benefits should have been accessible to 
all, membership to the scheme should have been compulsory and the amount available be the same 
for all subscribers,14 the bodies responsible for the management of these schemes would not 
constitute ‘undertakings’ on the ground that, to the extent that they were operating without a profit 
motive and in accordance with the principle of solidarity, they fulfilled a purely social function.15   
       A similar approach was adopted by the CJEU for the provision of taxpayer-funded healthcare 
services: in FENIN16 the General Court took the view that national health authorities who, for 
instance, purchased large supplies of medical equipment to be used to provide “universal” 
healthcare benefits to individuals, financed via social security contributions and supplied free-of-
charge, could not be regarded as “undertakings” for competition law purposes,17 on the ground that 
                                                          
5 Cases 286/82 and 26/83, Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro, [1984] ECR 377, para. 16. See also case C-
156/98, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931, para. 20. 
6 Id., para. 41. 
7 Id., para. 50. 
8 Id., para. 73-74. 
9 Id., para. 75. 
10 Id., para. 77-79. 
11 Id., para. 90; see also para. 87-89. 
12 Case C-159/91, Poucet v Assurances Générales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-
Roussillon, [1993] ECR I-637. 
13 Id., para. 10; see also para. 8. 
14 Id., para. 13. 
15 Id., para. 17-19. 
16 Case T-319/99, FENIN v Commission, [2003], ECR II-357, para. 35, 38; see also, inter alia joined cases C-
264/01 and others, AOK Bundesverband and others, [2004] ECR I-2493, para. 46. 
17 Id., para. 36-37; see also para. 39-40. 
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their supply-side activity could not be separated from the fulfilment of their statutory mandate for 
which these purchases were conducted.18  Thus, since the provision of services to citizens was based 
on principles of universality and of solidarity, the institution or body concerned could not be subject 
to the Treaty competition rules.19 
            It may be concluded that, in principle, healthcare services, even when they are publicly 
funded, remain subject to the EU single market and competition principles. However, member states 
retain extensive powers when designing and regulating the frameworks for their provision, albeit 
within constraints of “necessity”, “proportionality” and non-discrimination.  Also, as was illustrated 
in respect of the FENIN judgment, the choices as to the design of these systems can have a 
significant impact on the extent to which free market principles such as the competition rules can 
apply to the providers of these services, thus allowing for “non-economic considerations” to 
continue to apply in this area.  The next section will consider the nature of the competence enjoyed 
by the Union in the field of healthcare services and how this interacts with the “sovereignty” that 
member states retain vis-à-vis their healthcare services. 
 
2.2. Healthcare services and the TFEU—pursuing the public interest between limited 
competences and the good functioning of the single market 
 
The previous section considered the question of the “nature” of state-funded health services in the 
context of the TFEU and the issue of the extent to which they would be subject to the rules on free 
market and competition.  This section will consider the implications of the approach emerging from 
the case law for the EU’s own powers and in particular examine whether the Union can adopt 
measures affecting the provision of healthcare services, including those that are publicly funded.20  
According to Article 6 of the TFEU, public health is an area in which the Union enjoys competence 
only limited to “support, coordinate and supplement” the action of the Member States.   
            Article 168(7) TFEU further states that the Union can only take action to encourage mutual 
coordination and in that context improving the “complementarity of their health services in cross 
border areas (…)”, for the purpose of ensuring a high level of human health protection.21 Thus, the 
member states can decide independently how to organise, design and finance healthcare provision 
within the respective jurisdictions.22  The EU institutions, on their part, can only enact measures to 
encourage state coordination in, inter alia, the provision of health care services in cross-border 
situations so as to ensure that the sovereign powers enjoyed by the member states in this area do 
not unduly encroach upon the free movement of persons and of services’ rules.23   
           It is suggested that a good example of how this power is to be exercised is provided by the 
“Patients’ Directive”, i.e. Directive 2011/24/EU.24  The Directive crystallises25 a number of rights that 
the CJEU had already been recognised for EU citizens enjoying their free movement rights vis-à-vis 
health authorities, including, for instance, the entitlement to the reimbursement of expenses 
incurred in seeking cross-border health services that are among the benefits to which they would 
                                                          
18 Id., para. 36. 
19 Id., para. 39; see also case C-205/03 P, Fenin v Commission, [2006] ECR I-6295, para. 25-27. 
20 For an analysis of the powers enjoyed by the EU in the area of public health see e.g. Toebes at al., "The 
European Union and health and human rights", (2011) 4 EHRLR 411; Hervey and Varhencke, "EU law and public 
health: the law and policy patchwork", in Hervey et al. (Eds), Health systems Governance in Europe, 2010: CUP, 
p. 84-113.  
21 See e.g. , mutatis mutandis, case C158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931, para. 18.  
22 See e.g. case C372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 86 and 92; see also case C-385/99, Muller-Faure’, 
[2003] ECR I-270, para. 102-103. 
23 See e.g. C-157/99, Geraets-Smits et al., [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 44-45. 
24 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of 9 March 2011No 24 on the application of patients’ 
rights in cross-border healthcare, [2011] OJ L88/45, Preamble, Recital 10. 
25 Id., recital 11. 
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have been entitled in their state of origin.26  However, it only goes as far as to ensure that the 
functioning of the single market is not unduly impaired in the face of the significant autonomy 
enjoyed by the member states,27 with national governments and parliaments remaining fully 
responsible for deciding how to provide these services, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity28 and with the requirements laid down in, inter alia, Article 56 TFEU.29   
          Thus, in the landmark Watts decision the Court of Justice took the view that EU law did not 
prejudice the power of the member states to determine the conditions according to which social 
security benefits (including taxpayer-funded medical care) should be provided.30  In this context, it 
was recognised that reducing the “risk of seriously undermining the financial balance” of the 
framework for the provision of these services would represent an “overriding reason in the public 
interest” for limiting their freedom of movement.31  Subject to an assessment of whether any 
restrictions aimed prima facie at protecting the financial soundness of medical services provision 
were both appropriate and objectively necessary to attain this objective, ultimately in the interest of 
the survival of the population as a whole,32 the member states could, inter alia, limit the entitlement 
of nationals of other member states to receive medical care within their jurisdiction.33 
          It is submitted that broadly similar principles seem to underscore the approach adopted by the 
EU in the field of public procurement of these services.  While the remit of the paper does not allow 
for an examination of the discipline of public contracts in the Union and in the Member States, it is 
indispensable to note that private enterprises have come to play an increasingly important role in 
the delivery of public services:  the stipulation of these contracts is subject to rules (both substantial 
and procedural) that are largely harmonised34 and that aim to pursue a commitment to transparency 
and non-discrimination (especially on grounds of nationality) vis-à-vis all potential bidders, to ensure 
the good functioning of the single market.35 Nonetheless, it is legitimate to query whether 
considerations that are not strictly speaking of an “economic nature” can affect the applicability of 
these rules. It is suggested that these considerations are relevant both when it comes to deciding 
how to award a specific contract—e.g. whether it is necessary to “go out to tender” or whether, for 
example, it may be more appropriate to provide a specific service “in house”—and when 
establishing the selection criteria for winning bids: for this purpose, can the awarding body identify 
successful participants on the basis of, e.g. geographical criteria associated with the localisation of 
service providers to ensure continuity and quality of care for patients?36 
         As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the current Directive concerning the award of 
public contracts, consistently with the principles underpinning Article 168 TFEU, recognises the 
“sovereignty” of member states on the way in which the provision of these and, in general, of the 
                                                          
26 See Article 7 of Directive 2011/24. 
27 See e.g. Sauter, “The impact of EU Competition law on national healthcare services”, (2013) 28(4) ELRev 457 
at 463-465. 
28 Ibid.; see also, mutatis mutandis, Opinion 1/08, cit. (fn. 3), para. 133, 136; also case C-385/99, Muller-Faure’, 
[2003] ECR I-270, para. 102-103; Fenin, cit. (fn. 16), para. 38-40. 
29 See inter alia, mutatis mutandis, Opinion 1/08, loc. ult. cit.; also case C-385/99, Muller-Faure’, [2003] ECR I-
270, para. 102-103; case T-319/99, FENIN v Commission, [2003], ECR II-357, para. 35, 38-40. For commentary 
see inter alia Odudu, "Are state owned healthcare providers that are funded by general taxation undertakings 
subject to competition law?", (2011) 32(5) ECLR 231. 
30 Case C372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 92. 
31 Id., para. 102-103. 
32 Id., para. 104-106. 
33 Id., para. 110-111. 
34 See chiefly Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 2004/18/EC, [2004] OJ L134/114. 
35 Id., see e.g. Preamble, Recitals 1-3. 
36  See Directive of the European Parliament and the Council No 2014/24/EU, [2014] OJ L94/65, Preamble, 
Recital 118. 
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“essential services to the person” should be organised,37 including determining how these providers 
should be chosen.38    National agencies responsible for the provision of publicly funded health care 
services can therefore opt for doing so "in-house", either directly or via entities that they themselves 
control; 39  they can also decide to grant licenses to outside bodies that meet objective selection 
criteria identified in advance.40   Alternatively, health authorities can decide to "contract out" 
specific services and select the firm or firms to which the relevant contracts should be awarded on 
the basis of criteria that are not solely based on the "value-for-money" principle but also on more 
quality-based requirements41 linked to inter alia, the need to ensure the “continuity in the provision 
of public services” or the nature--whether mutualistic or otherwise--of organisations seeking to bid 
for relevant contracts.42 
             Thus, in Commission v Ireland it was held that public authorities would not be obliged to “go 
out to tender”43 if they were seeking to source services that they were under a statutory obligation 
to provide—such as emergency ambulance cover designed to assist fire services.44  In these cases, no 
“public contract” could be said to exist on the ground that the services concerned by it would be 
supplied “to the public, in the exercise of [the authority’s] own powers derived directly from 
statute”.45 As a result, none of the public procurement principles would apply.46   
        In Teckal the Court of Justice added that a Member State could opt for the "in-house" supply of 
public services, either directly or via controlled entities.47  However, even if a “public contract” was 
to be concluded and consequently—if all the other relevant conditions were met—the awarding 
body was under an obligation to “go out to tender”, it could rely on a “light touch regime” that the 
EU public procurement legislation recognises as being applicable to contract for the provision of 
“essential services to the person”.48  Accordingly, public agencies could identify and apply non-
economic criteria to the selection of winning bids, such as requirements inspired by the need to 
maintain continuity of care through geographic proximity of providers to patients, by concerns for 
securing the involvement of service users in that provision and, more generally, with a view to 
maintaining consistent and high quality of medical services.49  In any event, the award of these 
contracts remained subject to minimum requirements of transparency and of non-discrimination.50             
         It may be concluded that Article 168 TFEU affords member states a significant degree of 
discretion in determining their approaches to publicly funded healthcare provision, although the 
domestic authorities must abide by basic Treaty principles concerning the good functioning of the 
single market.  Whether healthcare services are provided directly or “contracted out” to private 
                                                          
37 See inter alia, mutatis mutandis, case C-300/07, H &C Oymanns GbR and others, [2009] ECR I-4779, para.51-
56; see also para. 59. 
38 See Directive of the European Parliament and the Council No 2014/24/EU, [2014] OJ L94/65, Preamble, 
Recital 114; for commentary, see e.g. Hatzopoulos, "Public procurement and state aid in national health care 
systems", in Hervey et al. (Eds), Health Systems Governance in Europe, 2010: CUP, pp. 389 ff. 
39 See e.g. case C-324/98, Telaustria, [2000] ECR I10745, para. 60-61. 
40 Ibid.  See also Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ 2004 L134/114, Annex II B. 
41 Ibid.; inter alia, see case C-321/03, Coname, ECR I-7287, para. 16-19. 
42Directive 2014/24, cit. (fn. 38), Recital 118, Preamble. 
43 Case C-532/03, Commission v Ireland, [2007] ECR I-801, para. 26-28; see also para. 35-36. 
44 Id., para. 31-32. 
45 Id., para. 33-35. 
46 Id., para. 35-36. 
47 Case C-107/98, Teckal Srl, [1999] ECR I-8121, para. 49-51. 
48 See e.g. most recently, case C-568/13, Azienda Ospedaliero-Universitaria di Careggi-Firenze v Data Medical 
Service Srl, judgment of 18 December 2014, nyr, para. 32-36; see also, inter alia, case C-305/08, COniSMA, 
[2009] ECR I-12129, para. 37, 43. 
49 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, case C-160/08, Commission v Germany, judgment of 29 April 2010, para. 124 ff. 
For comment see e.g. Wiggens, “Public procurement rules and cooperation between public sector entities”, 
(2011) 5 PPLR 157, especially pp. 158-159. 
50 See e.g. Teckal, cit. (fn. 47), para. 26. 
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providers, if necessary via public procurement processes, the competent agencies retain significant 
powers of appreciation in determining the rules according to which services should be supplied, the 
eligibility of users, the way in which they should be financed and, especially when public contracts 
are concluded, how winning bidders should be selected. 
 
3. Health care between the internal market and national sovereignty: how does it work in practice? 
The case of the United Kingdom 
 
3.1. The NHS as a tale of two nations: introductory remarks  
 
The previous sections discussed the position of publicly funded healthcare services in the context of 
the EU single market: it was illustrated that while in principle they remain subject to the Union rules 
on free movement and competition, the member states retain a significant degree of discretion 
when it comes to meeting the needs of public health of their population and especially to regulating 
access to and financing of these services, with the EU, as a consequence, enjoying only limited 
competences. 
          The limited scope of this paper does not allow for a detailed consideration of the complex 
questions concerning the design of health care systems in individual jurisdictions.51  Suffice it to say 
at this junction that in all the EU member states the provision of what has, as anticipated, been 
regarded as a key public service has traditionally occurred in light of principles of solidarity, equity, 
efficiency and affordable cost.52  However, as was illustrated in the earlier sections, the 
“sovereignty” enjoyed, albeit within limits, by each member states as regards the design and 
regulation pf publicly funded health care service provision has meant the emergence of different 
models and approaches, whether structural or concerning the regulation of these services.  
           Two different models can be identified as providing the most common blueprints in this 
context.  On the one hand, the “Beveridge” model entails that the universal provision of healthcare 
services free at the point of need be financed via general taxation; on the other hand, the 
“Bismarck” model relies on the role of sickness insurance schemes and institutions, to which all 
citizens are members and whose task is to invest contributions and use the revenue from these 
investments to fund sickness costs.53  A quick glance at the various systems across the Union reveals 
that there is significant variance in how these models have been implemented in each jurisdiction: 
challenges arising from an ageing and expanding population, whose needs are more and more 
diverse, and from increasingly limited financial and human resources have prompted all EU 
governments to consider how the supply mechanisms of these services can be rationalised so that 
current needs can still be met within the limits of a less generous settlement.54  
            To address these challenges, some member states have stuck to the “traditional” state-owned 
and controlled provision of these services, in accordance with the tenets of the “Beveridge” model 
and with the European idea of the welfare state.55  Others, instead, have opted from moving away, 
at least in part, from state-funded and, to an extent, solidarity-run structures toward the design of 
frameworks in which private providers on the one hand are more active and on the other hand 
healthcare agencies have become more independent of central government, on occasion to the 
                                                          
51 See e.g. European Parliament, “Health care systems in the EU: a comparative study”, (1999) SACO 101 EN 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘European Parliament report’), available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/saco/pdf/101_en.pdf; see also the Health Systems and Policy 
Monitor (HSPM) website, run by the European Observatory on health policies and systems, available at: 
http://www.hspm.org/mainpage.aspx (hereinafter referred to as ‘HSPM’), both last accessed on 17 January 
2016.  
52 See European Parliament Report, p. 5. 
53 Id., pp. 5-6; see also pp. 18-21. 
54 Id., p. 21. 
55 Ibid.; see also p. 19. 
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point of being competent to negotiate and oversee the implementation of services’ contracts with 
outside providers, whether public or private.56  In this specific context, the creation of a “split” 
between purchasers and providers of services has been regarded as essential for enhancing patient 
choice, creating greater efficiency in the delivery of services and improving cost effectiveness: at the 
core of these reforms, which have been taking place in several member states especially since the 
late 1980s and early 1990s has been the concern for creating an “internal market” in health care 
services, where competition would act as a central factor to achieve these objectives.57  
             Against this background, important questions emerge as to how the “sovereignty” enjoyed by 
the member states in respect of these matters can affect the scope and manner of application of the 
internal market rules.  To address these issues, the way in which the United Kingdom’s National 
Health Service (NHS) is organised in England and Wales as opposed to Scotland will be analysed.  As 
will be illustrated in greater detail in the following sections, the Scottish Parliament, to which 
competence in the field of public healthcare has been devolved as a result of the Scotland Act 
1997,58 has opted to retain the NHS fully in public hands, i.e. within the ownership and under the 
control of the Ministry of Health.59  By contrast, the Government and Parliament in London have 
progressively endeavoured to extend market based principles to this sector.60  This process was 
catalysed by the enactment of the Health and Social Care Act 2012.61   
           Due to the high level of trust that the NHS enjoys,62 it was inevitable that the “push” toward its 
marketization in England and Wales would fuel the concern that eventually the total privatisation of 
healthcare may occur.63  In parallel, a number of stakeholders has raised questions for the 
continuing sustainability of the fully public frameworks existing in Scotland, especially in respect of 
public procurement.  The next sections will consider whether these concerns are justified, having 
regard to the NHS’s set up existing, respectively, in Scotland and in England and Wales.   
 
3.2. The NHS in Scotland: relying on cooperation and state control, and ownership as a 
means of seeking optimal provision of publicly funded medical care 
 
The purpose of this section will be to provide a short overview of the NHS in Scotland and thereafter 
to attempt to gauge, however briefly, the extent to which the framework for healthcare provision is 
affected by the single market rules, namely free movement and competition principles. As was 
anticipated, the power to legislate in relation to the structure and functioning of the NHS in 
Scotland, as a “devolved matter” under the Scotland Act 1997, has been exercised so as to keep the 
NHS “in public hands”.64  Its running is entrusted to fourteen area boards, responsible for the 
                                                          
56 Id., p. 22. 
57 Ibid.; for commentary, see inter alia Guillen and Pavolini (Eds), Health care systems in Europe under 
austerity: institutional reforms and performance, 2013: Basingstoke, Palgrave, see especially pp. 193 ff. 
(Chapter 9). 
58 See e.g. SPICe Briefing, “The National Health Service in Scotland”, 21 June 2011, No 11/49, pp. 5-6. 
For commentary see inter alia Curran and Albert, “It seemed a good idea at the time”, (2014) 35(9) ECLR 419; 
see also Pownall, “Neoliberalism, austerity and the Health and Social Care Act 2012”, (2013) 42(4) Industrial L J 
422 at 429-430. 
59 See e.g. SPICe Briefing, “The National Health Service in Scotland”, 21 June 2011, No 11/49, pp. 5-6. 
60 See e.g. Pownall, cit. (fn. 58), p. 430. 
61 Ibid. 
62 See e.g. the summary data available at: http://www.nhsconfed.org/resources/key-statistics-on-the-nhs. See 
also, for comparison: House of Commons, Note: NHS funding and expenditure, SN/SG/724, 3 April 2012, 
available at: http://www.nhshistory.net/parlymoney.pdf, sect. 1.1-1.2. 
63 See e.g.: http://www.patients4nhs.org.uk/eu-us-free-trade-agreement-or-ttip/; see also the Resolution 
adopted by the English TUC at the 2014 Annual Conference on TTIP, available at: 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/international-issues/trade/congress-2014-composite-resolution-transatlantic-trade-
and-investment.  
64 See e.g. SPICe Briefing, “The National Health Service in Scotland”, cit. (fn. 59), pp. 5-6. 
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allocation of resources and the implementation of healthcare strategies via NHS Boards, Community 
Health Partnerships and Operating Divisions.65  These bodies operate according to principles of 
cooperation and are under direct control of the competent Minister.66  Performance objectives are 
set by the Scottish Government and achieved by NHS Boards, in accordance with the relevant 
delivery plans, under ministerial supervision.67  
           At the core of their strategy is a commitment to providing “(…) safe, high quality services that 
are as local as possible and as specialised as necessary”,68 so as to maintain high levels of public 
health, safeguarding the survival of their population and protecting the financial stability of their 
own health frameworks.69  This objective is met in a variety of ways, ranging from the provision of 
services “in –house”—either directly or via bodies under the control of the NHS Scotland’s Boards—
or through the commissioning of these services in accordance with framework agreements that are 
negotiated on a UK wide basis.70   
           Under the leadership of the Government’s General Directorate for Health, the Boards, acting 
as “all-purpose organisations” and closely supervised by the local area partnerships,71 provide 
services to patients either directly or by commissioning them to independent contractors, such as, 
among others, GPs, dentists and pharmacies.72  They are responsible for the provision of hospital 
care, on a territorial basis, as well as for ensuring key services in cooperation with local authorities 
and communities via local area partnerships. Overall quality of service and continuity of provision 
are guaranteed via specialised agencies, such as Healthcare Improvement Scotland.73   Central to the 
activity of the Scottish NHS is a strong emphasis on collaboration, partnership and the sharing of 
resources across the sector; in addition, the fact that there is no “split” between purchaser and 
provider means that there is no such a thing as a “contract” for the supply of key services, such as, 
inter alia, hospital care, which is managed “in-house” by a bespoke operating division of each 
Board.74   
          It is suggested that a parallel can be drawn between the structure of the Scottish NHS and the 
framework for the provision of public healthcare existing in, inter alia, Denmark, where medical 
services are delivered by a wholly publicly funded and owned system articulated in central, regional 
and local agencies who act under the overarching supervision of the Ministry of Health.75  Just as in 
Scotland, Danish patients access out- and inpatient services by consulting their general practitioners 
first—who therefore act as “gatekeepers”: hospitals are owned, by and large, by regional or local 
health agencies and services are supplied directly by the public healthcare organisation, without 
there being any “split” between purchasers and providers.76  Publicly funded health care is 
predominantly funded by general taxation, with co-payment by patients being required for certain 
services (such as dental care).77   
                                                          
65 Ibid. 
66 See e.g. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Health/About/NHS-Scotland.  
67 See inter alia http://www.ournhsscotland.com/our-nhs/nhsscotland-how-it-works.  
68 See Kerr Report: Delivering for health, 2 November 2005, available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/11/02102635/26356, Executive summary. 
69 See e.g. Watts, cit. (fn. 22), para. 86 and 92; see also Muller-Faure’, cit. (fn. 22), para. 102-103. 
70 See inter alia SPICe briefing, cit. (fn. 59), pp. 4 ff. 
71 Id., see e.g. pp. 5-6 and 17-18. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 See inter alia Timmins, “The four UK health systems”, paper produced for the King’s Fund, in association 
with European Observatory, available at: http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/four-uk-health-systems-
june-2013, p. 4-5. 
75 See European Parliament Report, p. 41-41; see also Denmark, Country report, submitted to the HSPM, 
available at: http://www.hspm.org/countries/denmark27012013/countrypage.aspx; see especially section 2.1. 
76 Ibid., see section 5.1. and 5.3. 
77 Ibid.,section 3.2; see also sect. 3.3-3.4; see also European Parliament Report, p. 44. 
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           In light of the forgoing analysis, it is submitted that to the extent that these powers have been 
devolved to the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament as a result of the constitutional 
settlement reached in the UK in 1997, the regional authorities in Edinburgh have opted for “shaping” 
the Scottish NHS according to principles of public stewardship, cooperation and governmental 
control and thereby limiting the reach of the tenets of the free market and of private sector 
involvement in the provision of these services free at the point of need.78  Adopting this institutional 
choice, however, has significant consequences for the applicability of the EU internal market and 
competition rules.79 It is argued that to the extent that taxpayer-funded medical services are 
provided “in-house”, the relevant commercial practices are likely to be regarded as the expression of 
“single firm conduct” and as such falling outside the remit of Article 101 TFEU.80 It is added that the 
circumstance that these services are provided free at the point of need and thus pursue a mutuality-
based goal is strongly indicative of their “non-economic nature”:81 thus, in accordance with the 
principles enshrined in the FENIN judgment, it is suggested that this may exclude the applicability of 
the EU competition rules and in particular, in as much as health authorities are likely to wield 
significant market powers in respect of their purchasing and supplying patterns, Article 102 TFEU.82 
       It is further observed that the choices of health care systems’ design made in Edinburgh have 
equally important consequences for the extent to which the obligations arising from EU public 
procurement legislation are applicable to potentially “awarding bodies” within Scotland.  As was 
illustrated above, it is expected that since the bulk of these services are provided in-house, public 
procurement legislation is going to receive very limited application.83  If however Scottish health 
agencies were to source services from the private sector and for that purpose either opted for or 
were obliged to go out to tender, they would remain entitled to rely on the “light touch regime” that 
the EU legislation provides for “essential services to the person”: thus, beyond general obligations of 
transparency and non-discrimination, they can identify selection criteria for winning bids that are 
“non-economic” in nature or indeed not linked to the “value for money” concept.84  
         It is therefore concluded that the nature of the choices made by the Scottish authorities in 
respect of its structure and operation, any degree of “opening up to the market” for the devolved 
NHS is unlikely to derive from the application of the Union single market principles.  It should also be 
emphasised that important safeguards, such as the principles of conferral and of subsidiarity, 
contribute to protecting the scope of discretion that the Parliament in Edinburgh enjoys in this area. 
 
3.3. State-funded healthcare in England and Wales—toward a “neoliberal” framework for 
the provision of these services… but what does this mean for market access? 
 
The previous section briefly outlined the key principles governing the design and the functioning of 
the NHS in Scotland and in that context discussed the impact of the choices made in this area on the 
achievement of the internal market.  The situation is, however, admittedly very different in England 
and Wales, where, unlike in Scotland, there has been a clear “push” toward creating a “internal 
market” of health care services, especially since 2010.  The Health and Social Care Act 2012 was 
enacted for the purpose of “(…) promot[ing] competition amongst an increasingly diverse base of 
private, public and non-profit providers of public services, with the ultimate aim of raising the 
standards of service-provision and reducing its costs (…)”.85   To achieve these objectives, the Act 
abolished bodies such as the Primary Care Trusts and the strategic health authorities, along with the 
                                                          
78 Timmins, cit. (fn. 74), see especially pp. 18-19. 
79 See e.g. Geraets-Smits et al, cit. (fn. 23), para. 44-45. 
80 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, case C-73/95, Viho Europe v Commission, [1996] ECR I-465. 
81 See, Geraets-Smits, loc.ult.cit. 
82 FENIN, cit. (fn. 16), para. 35-40. 
83 See inter alia, case C-305/08, COniSMA, [2009] ECR I-12129, para. 37, 43. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Sanchez-Graells, “New rules for healthcare procurement in the UK”, (2015) 1 PPLR 16 at 19. 
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NHS executive, and replaced the former with Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and with a new 
NHS England commissioning board: CCGs act under the supervision of the commissioning board, 
which is also responsible for the direct purchasing of certain specialised services.86   They are led by 
GPs and are responsible for the purchasing of medical services from third party providers, which in 
turn can either be publicly (e.g. NHS Foundation Trusts) or privately owned.87 
          As a result of the 2012 Act the framework for the provision of healthcare services has reverted 
to reliance on the “purchaser-provider” split that had characterised their provision for much of the 
1980s and until 1997.88   On this point, a parallel can be drawn with the structure of the Health 
Services existing in Spain and in Sweden.  In respect to the former, a recent report of the European 
Observatory of Health Policies and Systems (HSPM) found that health authorities are competent for 
setting out budgets, identifying healthcare objectives and monitoring their achievement.  For this 
purpose, they act as purchasing agencies vis-a-vis service providers, which are selected according to 
a number of principles, such as, among others, value for money and the need to secure the most 
efficient use of resources.89   
           It should be noted that at the core of these reforms was at least initially a concern for 
enhancing efficiency and stability of the Spanish Health Service (Servicio Nacional de la Salud, SNS) 
both at central and at regional and local levels.  This end was to be attained via the introduction of 
"elements of market simulation" to achieve greater cost effectiveness and guarantee patient choice.  
However, as was illustrated more recently by the HSPM, the outcome of these reforms in practice 
has been markedly different: the updated Country Report found that these changes have 
encouraged the modernisation of management practices within the SNS and ushered the emergence 
of an evaluation-based culture, with clear gains, such as, inter alia, the more efficient allocation of 
limited resources and more transparent and effective management.90  In this context, significant 
emphasis was placed on the connection between budgetary constraints and the scope and nature of 
the activity undertaken by health bodies and on the importance of constant monitoring on the use 
of resources and on accountability of providers.91  
           Partly similar considerations can be made in respect of Sweden.  Commentators observed that 
the purchaser-provider split introduced in that jurisdiction was based on "contract management and 
evaluation" and relied on a robust competitive process for the selection of providers.92  Accordingly, 
it was argued that the move toward a separation between purchasing and provision functions 
should have been seen as a tool for enhancing competition and transparency during the phase of 
tendering and selection of providers, so that the "best bid" can be identified.93  Seen in this light, it 
was suggested, therefore, that the purchaser-provider split had been introduced not so much to 
create competition "in the market" for the supply of medical services funded by the taxpayer, but as 
a means of enhancing competition "for the market" by exposing the process of selection of winning 
bidders to genuine transparency and rivalry.94 
                                                          
86 See Timmins, cit. (fn. 74), p. 13. 
87 Id., pp. 3-4. 
88 Id., p. 3-4. 
89 See country report: Spain, published by HSPM and available at: 
http://www.hspm.org/countries/spain25062012/livinghit.aspx?Section=4.1%20Regulation&Type=Section, last 
accessed on 28 January 2016. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid.; see also, e.g., section 6.1 of the report, available at: 
http://www.hspm.org/countries/spain25062012/livinghit.aspx?Section=4.1%20Regulation&Type=Section, last 
accessed on 28 January 2016. 
92 Siverbo, "The purchaser-provider split in principle and practice: experience in Sweden", (2004) 20(4) 
Financial Accountability and Management 401, pp. 409-410. 
93 Id., pp. 410-411. 
94 Ibid.; see also HSPM, Country report: Sweden, available at: 
http://www.hspm.org/countries/sweden25022013/livinghit.aspx?Section=5.1 Public health&Type=Section, 
last accessed on 28 January 2016, especially section 2.8. 
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         The summary analysis conducted above seems to show that just as in England and Wales, other 
member states have faced the question of how to achieve efficiency, affordability and greater 
patient choice and have chosen to tackle it via the adoption of "market-inspired" solutions in the 
sourcing and supplying of services.  However, it appears to emerge from the cursory examination of 
the impact of the purchaser-provider split in other member states that these reforms have had a 
considerably different impact in these jurisdictions as opposed to England and Wales.  It is suggested 
that in Spain and Sweden there seems to be a greater concern for ensuring open, transparent and 
cost-efficient tendering so that the "best provider" can be allowed to emerge and can be held 
accountable once it performs its functions.95  In England and Wales, instead, the Health and Social 
Care Act has been implemented with a view to adhering more closely (albeit not fully, as will be seen 
below) to free market principles and to upholding competition not just "for the market" but "in the 
market".96  It is emphasised that the 2012 Act imposes on NHS commissioners an obligation not to 
engage in anti-competitive behaviour unless restrictive practices are justified “in the patients’ 
interest”.97    To ensure the effective application of this principle, the Act has conferred on the sector 
regulator, Monitor, which is generally responsible for authorising new entities seeking to start 
providing healthcare services and for regulating their activity competition enforcement powers, the 
requirement of working in a regime of concurrency with the Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA).98    
          Having regard more specifically to its competition mandate, its role encompasses not only 
detecting and sanctioning anti-competitive behaviour but also the application of the competition 
rules in a way that contributes to the "patients' interests (...) by improving the quality of these 
services (...) and reducing inequalities in respect of both access to service and outcome of 
treatment.99   It has been suggested therefore that this aspect of Monitor's mandate allows it to 
authorise otherwise objectionable behaviour on the ground that the latter is regarded as justified 
and indispensable to secure “(…) seamless, well-coordinated and uninterrupted provision of health 
care services (…)” in accordance with clinical considerations:100 they should be inspired by 
qualitative, clinically led considerations and should focus on striking an appropriate balance between 
the “costs” associated with a loss of competition (e.g. in terms of reduced incentives to innovate or 
to provide better “value-for-money” services for providers) and the benefits accruing to patients as a 
result of the practice, in light of hard evidence.101  If the benefits, on the whole, overcome the 
drawbacks for rivalry and no less restrictive alternatives exist vis-à-vis the prima facie restrictive 
arrangement, the latter will be deemed to be “in the interest of patients”.102   
                The 2012 Act has also had an impact on the procurement practices internal to the NHS, by 
imposing on commissioning bodies a general duty not to engage in conduct that is restrictive of 
competition. At the same time, however, it maintains a significant degree of discretion for 
commissioning bodies when they decide whether or not to “contract out” these services and, more 
broadly, which "tool" to adopt to select the “best provider”: in this context, awarding the contract 
via an open bidding process is only one of the available options,103 in parallel with, inter alia, 
entrusting the provision of the services to a “single capable provider” or supplying them “in 
house”.104  Furthermore, even when the commissioning body determined that “going out to tender” 
                                                          
95 See e,g, Siverbo, cit. (fn, 92), pp. 415-416. 
96 See inter alia Timmins, cit. (fn. 74), pp. 4-5. 
97 Sanchez-Graells, cit. (fn. 85), p. 20. 
98 See Timmins, cit. (fn. 74), p. 3. 
99 Sanchez-Graells, cit. (fn. 85), p. 20; see Article 62(4), Health and Social Care (England and Wales) Act 2012. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Timmins, cit. (fn. 74), p. 21; see also Monitor, Substantive Guidance on procurement, patient choice and 
competition regulations, (2013), available at: http://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/s75, pp. 61 ff.; see especially 
pp. 62-63. 
103 See Monitor, Substantive Guidance, cit. (fn. 102), p.39. 
104 Id., p. 20; see also p. 41. 
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was the best option, it would remain entitled to rely on criteria not necessarily linked to the concept 
of “best value for money”105 and based on non-monetary considerations, albeit within the 
constraints of predictability, transparency, non-arbitrariness and non-discrimination.106 Paramount 
to the adoption of these decision must be a commitment on the part of the CCGs to “ensuring [inter 
alia] quality, continuity, accessibility, affordability, availability and comprehensiveness of the 
services, the specific needs of different categories of users, including disadvantaged and vulnerable 
groups (…)”.107    
          Thus, Monitor has indicated that commissioning bodies can, for instance, subordinate cost 
reduction demands to the need to “co-locate” services by selecting providers acting in a certain area 
if this is regarded as objectively necessary to meet a clinical need;108 they can also restrict the pool of 
potential bidders only to those providers whose services meet certain requirements of quality, on 
the basis of medical considerations or allow two or more successful bidders to cooperate in the 
provision of services provided that any loss in “short-term” competition is counterbalanced by actual 
or future gains in terms of patients’ choice.109   
        It is suggested that this approach remains broadly consistent with, and can therefore be 
accommodated in the framework of principles governing EU public procurement: as was discussed in 
section 2.2, the “light touch regime” applicable to the award of public contracts concerning 
“essential services to the person” allows awarding bodies to rely on selection criteria that are not 
exclusively based on the “value for money” principle.110   In any event, awarding bodies must not act 
in a way that can lead to the elimination of all competition in the bidding process, especially in 
respect of access to it.111  As a result, commissioning bodies can, for instance, subordinate cost 
reduction demands to the need to “co-locate” services by selecting providers acting in a certain area 
if this is regarded as objectively necessary to meet a clinical need;112 they can also restrict the pool of 
potential bidders only to those providers whose services meet certain requirements of quality, on 
the basis of medical considerations or allow two or more successful bidders to cooperate in the 
provision of services provided that any loss in “short-term” competition is counterbalanced by actual 
or future gains in terms of patients’ choice.113  However, these benefits must be “material” to the 
practice, likely to be realised within a relatively short time and supported by appropriate scientific 
research; in addition, commissioning bodies should consider whether a “less restrictive alternative” 
exists vis-à-vis the arrangement in question, in order to attain these outcomes.114 
              The above analysis suggests that the 2012 reforms have introduced a framework for the 
publicly funded provision of healthcare services inspired by “neoliberal”, relatively market-driven 
principles.  These tenets are, however, tempered in their application by a recognition of the sensitive 
nature of these economic activities: in this context, the role of the EU-inspired “light touch regime” 
in respect to procurement practices, on the one hand, and the notion of “patients’ interest” are 
crucial for the purpose of allowing non-economic benefits in terms of greater quality, availability and 
accessibility of care to prevail over market-oriented considerations.115  It is however just as evident 
that the 2012 reforms, by creating greater space for the involvement of private providers that often 
                                                          
105 Id., pp. 38-39. 
106 Id., p. 20-21; see also p. 41-42. 
107 See Article 76(8), Directive of the Council and the European Parliament 2004/24/EU, [2014] OJ L94/65. 
108 Id., p. 26. 
109 Id., pp. 27-30; see also pp. 45 ff. For commentary, see e.g. Sanchez-Graells, cit. (fn. 85), pp. 28-29. 
110 See e.g. Monitor, Guidance, cit. (fn. 102), pp. 18-19; see also, mutatis mutandis, pp. 64-65. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Id., p. 26. 
113 Id., pp. 27-28; see also pp. 45 ff. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid.; see also, mutatis mutandis, the approach adopted by the Commission in its Guidance on the 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU, [2004] OJ C101/97, e.g. at para. 32-33, para. 48, 51-54, 107-114.  For 
analysis of issues arising from the impact of EU competition law on health services, see Odudu, "The impact of 
EU competition law on national healthcare systems", (2013) 38(4) ELRev 457.   
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act with a profit-making purpose, raises more general questions as to whether the Service can still 
maintain its “mutuality-based” nature.116  It has been suggested that the question of whether these 
services are likely to remain of a solidarity-led, as opposed to profit-making, nature should be 
addressed by taking into account all the features characterising the manner in which they are 
provided.117 Thus, rather than carrying out a “granular evaluation” of each agreement governing the 
delivery of these services,118 regard should be had to a variety of factors, such as the ratio between 
the price charged to health authorities and the costs borne by the provider, of the manner in which 
these charges are determined and of how and by whom (i.e. whether these decisions are taken by 
the state authorities or are left to the parties’ freedom to contract, for instance) the corresponding 
benefits for users of the services in issue are decided.119  The assessment of the degree of control 
that the Government exercises on both the services themselves and the conduct of their providers is 
also essential.120        
          In light of the forgoing analysis, it is argued that while the 2012 reforms heralded numerous 
and very significant changes in the way in which state-funded health care is provided in England and 
Wales,  by opening up this sector to greater private firms’ involvement, they have not affected the 
“citizen-facing” aspects of these important public services.  It is argued that to the extent that these 
services remain “free at the point of need”, they retain, on the whole, their “solidarity based” 
nature, even when they are supplied via a non-state actor.  Consequently, it is submitted that the 
rules on competition may not be applicable to the activities undertaken by the entities concerned.121  
Furthermore, having regard to the role and approach adopted by Monitor in these matters, the 
notion of ‘patients’ interest’ is likely to prove an effective instrument to introduce considerations of 
“public policy” in the assessment of prima face anti-competitive conduct (such as, inter alia, 
cooperation arrangements), so as to achieve continuity of care and ensure more seamless service 
provision.122   
        In light of the forgoing analysis, it is concluded that the 2012 reforms have marked a move 
toward the extension of free market principles to the functioning of the NHS in England and Wales: 
consistently with the wide powers of appreciation that it enjoys in this area, the Parliament in 
Westminster has extended competition and patients' choice principles to certain aspects of this 
sector, without however altering the "patient-facing" nature of these services, which remain free at  
the point of need.   
         In this context, it is emphasised that the derogations in the public interest that the TFEU 
expressly allows via Article 56, taken together with the "safety valves" provided by the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012--such as the concept of "patients' interest"--are likely to ensure that, whenever 
this is regarded as necessary to safeguard high levels of public health and is kept within the limits of 
the principle of proportionality, non-economic criteria can be relied upon to justify restrictions to 
the application of market-oriented principles. 
 
3.4. Beyond the single market: EU common commercial policy and possible implications for state-
funded healthcare--access to all areas? 
 
The previous sections discussed the position of taxpayer-funded healthcare services within the TFEU 
and highlighted that while these activities are subject in principle to the rules on free movement, 
                                                          
116 Case T-319/99, FENIN, cit. (fn. 16), para. 35-37.  See also, mutatis mutandis, Bettercare v DGFT, [2003] ECC 
40, especially, paras. 98-99 and 101-102. See also Sinclair, “Undertakings in competition law at the public-
private interface—an unhealthy situation”, (2014) 35(4) ECLR 167 at 168-169. 
117 Sauter, cit. (fn. 27), p. 465-466. 
118 Sinclair, cit. (fn. 116), p. 169. 
119 Sauter, cit. (fn. 27), p. 466. 
120 Id., pp. 464-465. 
121 See Monitor, Guidance, cit. (fn. 102), p. 62-63. 
122 Ibid. 
15 
 
their nature justifies the existence of derogations to the application of these Treaty rules.  It was  
observed more generally that in accordance with broader EU tenets, such as the principles of 
conferral and of subsidiarity, the member states remain "sovereign" on their healthcare systems: as 
was confirmed by the EU Court of Justice, to the extent that they are best placed to assess the 
healthcare needs of their population, domestic authorities should be allowed a broad discretion in 
deciding how to design and regulate the provision of publicly funded health services, with the Union 
only empowered to enact measures aimed at "supporting and coordinating" this function, so that 
the internal market is not impaired in its operation. 
        However, as was briefly illustrated in section 3.1, the way in which the member states exercise 
these powers can have a significant impact on the scope of application of many single market 
principles: as was observed in sections 3.2 and 3.3 in relation to the NHS structure in, respectively, 
Scotland and England and Wales, the decision of "how much" or "how little market" to inject into 
the provision of taxpayer-funded medical care that reaches the patient "free at the point of need" 
remains solely with the domestic authorities.  It is however undeniable that the forgoing analysis has 
only addressed questions concerning the interplay between member states' powers in this area and 
the internal powers enjoyed by the EU.  It may be reminded that according to Article 207 TFEU, the 
Union enjoys the power to enter into agreements with third countries in matters of common 
commercial policy: as is well-known, as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon, this area of competence now 
encompasses also trade in services.  Perhaps more importantly, it should be emphasised that this 
power belongs exclusively to the EU.123  In light of the forgoing, it is not entirely surprising that the 
current negotiation of the EU/US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have raised 
questions as to the extent to which lowering the barriers to trade in EU markets for undertakings 
affiliated to the a country such as the US, where healthcare is almost entirely subject to the rules of 
the market, could encourage the process of privatisation of this sector also in the member states of 
the Union.  The purpose of this section is to explore whether these concerns are justified. 
       The limited remit of this contribution does not allow for an examination of the issues arising 
from the scope and manner of exercise of the EU's treaty-making powers.   However, it is 
indispensable to note that according to Article 207(6) TFEU the exclusive competence enjoyed by the 
Union in this area must not be exercised in a way that either alters the division of competences 
between the EU and the member states or results in "the harmonisation of legislative or regulatory 
provisions of the member states" in area where such harmonisation is not allowed.  It may be added 
that the case law of the EU Court of Justice has gradually evolved from a relatively generous 
interpretation of the scope of the Union's external powers that had been motivated by a concern for 
the effective attainment of the Treaty objectives to a far more restrictive reading of the provisions 
governing treaty making authority.124   Thus, the EU Court of Justice held that these powers could 
only be implied on the basis of the existence of a co-extensive internal competence if the unilateral 
stipulation of a treaty by individual member states could have endangered the integrity of the Union 
internal rules that largely covered the same area, in light of a careful examination of their “nature 
and content (…), current state and (…) future development.125 
         It is argued that these principles, which should be read also in light of the more general 
commitment to introducing greater clarity and certainty in the delimitation of member states/EU 
competences, undertaken at the Lisbon IGC, remain broadly consistent with the principle of 
                                                          
123 See e.g. most recently case C-81/13, Commission v Council, Opinion of AG Kokott, 17 July 2014 nyr, para. 
132-133. For commentary, see e.g. Kostandinides, “EU foreign policy under the doctrine of implied powers”, 
(2014) 39(4) ELRev 511, p. 524. 
124 See chiefly case 22/70, Re: ERTA, [1971] ECR 263, para. 13; see also para. 18-22.  See also Opinion 1/76, Re: 
Inland Waterway Vessels Convention, [1977] ECR 741; Opinion 1/94, [1994] ECR I-5267, especially para. 77, 85-
86.  For commentary, see Emiliou, "Toward a clearer demarcation line?", (1994) 19(1) ELRev 76 at 82-83; also 
Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law, 8th Ed., 2014: OUP, pp. 180-181. 
125 See Opinion 1/2003, Re: Lugano Convention, [2006] ECR I-1145, para. 126-127; for commentary, see inter 
alia Cremona, “Extending the reach of the AERT principle”, (2009) 34(5) ELRev 754 at 762-763. 
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conferral.126  Accordingly, it is submitted that whether TTIP may have an impact on the provision of 
publicly funded healthcare services is a question that can only be addressed upon an assessment of 
the competence that the Union and the member states respectively enjoy in this area.127   On this 
point, two considerations should be made: the first concerns the nature of the powers that the 
Union enjoys in the field of common commercial policy.  It is observed that while this is an area of 
exclusive competence to the Union, its exercise must, according to Article 207 TFEU, conform not 
only to the "principles and objectives of the Union's external action", but also to more general 
principles affecting the exercise of the competences that the member states have conferred to the 
EU in the founding Treaties.128    The circumstance that, according to the last indent of that provision, 
the Union cannot, as was anticipated above, either alter the scope of its own powers or bring about 
harmonisation in areas in which this type of action is not allowed, can be read as confirming that the 
scope of the powers of external action enjoyed by the EU is necessarily constrained by the principle 
of conferral:129 thus, it is submitted that to the extent that the Union cannot adopt internal 
harmonisation measures  concerning the provision of publicly funded health care services, it also 
lacks the power to achieve the same objective by way of undertaking international obligations, as 
part of its common commercial policy remit.130  
          From the forgoing flows the second consideration, namely that especially when trade 
negotiations aim to secure commitments In a wide range of areas, as in the case of TTIP, regard 
should be had to what type of competence the EU enjoys in respect to each aspect of the envisaged 
agreement.131   It is argued that if these areas are subject to shared powers between the Union and 
the member states, the final outcome of the negotiations is going to be a “mixed” agreement: as a 
result, for those obligations affecting fields in respect of which national authorities retain powers of 
action, the final agreement will have to be ratified by each member states in accordance with the 
relevant constitutional requirements.132  In addition, in the course of the negotiations, member 
states must be "closely associated" with the Commission so that their interests can be appropriately 
taken into account.133 
          It should be emphasised that this approach has been expressly endorsed by the EU 
Commission: in a letter sent to the "presidents and chairmen" of the parliaments of the member 
states, the Commissioner for Trade stated that the continuing association of the member states in 
the negotiation process, taken together with their power to scrutinise the final outcome, would 
contribute to assuaging the concerns for protecting the margin of appreciation that the domestic 
authorities enjoy in areas of joint competence.134  It is submitted that the negotiation of TTIP, whose 
remit could potentially encompass the trade of health services, some of which may be taxpayer-
funded in individual member states, represents a very good example of how a prima facie wide and 
exclusive authority to act such as the one enjoyed by the EU in common commercial policy matters 
must be necessarily limited by the corresponding and extensive sovereignty that Article 168 TFEU 
                                                          
126 See e.g. Opinion No 1/2003, Re: Lugano Convention, [2006] ECR I-1145, para. 126-128, 132-133; see also 
case C-81/13, cit. (fn. 123), judgment of the ECJ, 18 December 2014, para. 61-62.  For commentary, see e.g. 
Kostantinides, cit. (fn. 123), p. 512-513; also, mutatis mutandis, Cremona, “Balancing Union and member 
states interests”, (2010) 35(5) ELRev 678 at 692. 
127 See e.g. Opinion 1/2008, Re: GATS, [2009] ECR I-11129, para. 119-120; see also para. 132-134. 
128 See e.g. caseC-81/13, Commission v Council, Opinion of AG Kokott, 17 July 2014 nyr, para. 58, 70, 77-81. 
129 Id., para. 74-81; see also judgment of the Court, 18 December 2014, nyr, para. 62. 
130 See inter alia mutatis mutandis, Opinion 1/2008, cit. (fn. 109), para. 120; see also para. 133-134. 
131 Id., para. 132-133. 
132 Ibid.; see also Report to the House of Commons, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership”, 18 
December 2014, available at: www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn06688.pdf, pp. 15-16. 
133 See e.g. Opinion 1/2008, cit. (fn. 127), para. 134-136; see also Report to the House of Commons, cit. (fn. 
132), p. 16; for commentary see e.g. McKee et al, "Public Health policies", in Hervey et al. (eds.), cit. (fn. 20), 
pp. 231-281, especially pp. 235 ff. 
134 C(2014) 7557 final, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2014/EN/3-2014-7557-
EN-F1-1.Pdf, especially p. 2; see also Report to the House of Commons, cit. (fn. 132), p. 3. 
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recognises as belonging to the Member States.135     As was illustrated earlier, health care provision is 
a field in which the EU only enjoys "coordinating" and "supporting" competence, that is, the power 
only to ensure that the "sovereignty" maintained by the member states over publicly funded health 
care provision does not distort the functioning of the internal market, with the Member States 
remaining competent to pursue public interest goals136 through organisational, financial and 
regulatory measures---albeit conforming to the principles of “necessity” and “proportionality”.137  
            It is acknowledged that the Union enjoys a certain power to regulate the “single market 
aspects” of the publicly funded provision of these services to the benefit of the citizens of the Union 
and has indeed exercise it, e.g. by enacting the Patients’ Directive.138  Nonetheless, it is strongly 
doubted that a corresponding external competence to act could be advocated solely on the basis of 
this limited authority to take action.139  It is reminded that, as was expressly stated by the EU Court 
of Justice in a recent judgment, the undertaking of international obligations can only be allowed as 
the expression of an implied external power if the corresponding internal competence--in this case 
the power to "support and coordinate" member states' internal health care policies so as to 
safeguard the good functioning of the internal market---cannot be exercised affectively.140   As was 
explained by AG Kokott in a recent Opinion, if the effective application of common internal rules was 
not adversely affected by the absence of external rules, designed, e.g., to deal with issues arising 
from the legal position of third country nationals, the Union could not legitimately claim an 
unexpressed power to  enter into international obligations in areas of joint competence with the 
member states.141   
          Against this background, it is argued that the Union could not, by means of TTIP, undertake 
obligations that may de facto result in the "privatisation by stealth" of the member states' 
frameworks (both organisational and normative) for the provision of publicly funded healthcare 
services.  It is submitted that to hold otherwise would amount to allowing the Union to short-circuit 
the system of principles designed to govern the scope of its powers vis-a-vis those enjoyed by the 
member states and in particular to act in disregard of the "sovereignty" that the latter retain over 
their healthcare systems.142  It is further submitted that even if the Union was committed to 
negotiate with a third country a greater degree of liberalisation of the trade in services and 
therefore to accept that undertakings affiliated to that state should enjoy greater market access 
within the EU, the member states would still be able to rely on their "sovereignty" over taxpayer 
funded medical care to regiment access to their own market for these services.143  Consequently, it is 
argued that only if the member states agreed to amend the Treaty so as to confer on the Union 
stronger and more extensive powers in this area could the EU seek to engender greater convergence 
in matter of healthcare provision--including provision that is publicly funded--perhaps by seeking to 
introduce more "market led" modes for the supply of these services.144 
           It is emphasised that the EU Commission itself seems to have adopted a position which is in all 
consistent with the forgoing approach. In a letter dated 8 July 2014 and addressed to the Chair of 
the All-Party Parliamentary Group on TTIP, the Director for the USA and Canada division of the EU 
Commission’s Directorate General for Trade expressed the view that adhering to TTIP would not 
affect the “rights of the Member States to manage their own health systems according to their 
                                                          
135 See also, e.g., Opinion 1/2003, cit. (fn. 127), para. 126-128; see also para. 133. 
136 See inter alia, Geraets-Smits et al., cit. (fn. 23) para. 44-45; also Watts, cit. (fn. 22), para. 86. 
137 See e.g. , mutatis mutandis, Kohll, cit. (fn. 5), para. 18. 
138 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of 9 March 2011 No 24, cit. (fn. 24). 
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various needs”.145  Accordingly, the Commission confirmed that any commitment to increasing 
market access in this field would neither affect national discretion to decide how to provide these 
service nor change existing approaches to public procurement, which would remain amenable to the 
"light touch approach" discussed above.146  It is added that this conclusion seems to be confirmed by 
the recently stipulated Canada/Europe Trade Agreement (CETA), where the negotiating parties 
undertook to refrain from applying market access, liberalisation and non-discrimination principles in 
the field of health care and of other similar, “sensitive services".147 
           It is concluded that the ongoing trade negotiations between the EU and the US represent both 
a challenge and an opportunity for either party: an opportunity, because they are likely to create 
greater trade and growth opportunities; and a challenge, because they raise complex questions as to 
how "local realities", that are typical of "sensitive sectors", such as healthcare, are going to continue 
being addressed at "local level", even though this may entail a derogation from general principles of 
market access.  It is however clear from the forgoing analysis that the careful observance of the rules 
governing the observance of the rules governing the competence of the EU vis-a-vis the powers 
enjoyed by the member states is going to be crucial to ensure that legitimate inroads in the free 
movement, competition and market access principles are maintained, so that the good functioning 
of the EU single market, also in the wider context of an increasingly globalised world trade, does not 
unduly impair the attainment of legitimate public interest goals.  
 
4. Publicly funded health care between local needs and open markets: "special services" in an 
increasingly globalised economy? Tentative conclusions 
 
Providing healthcare services free at the point of need has been a hallmark of modern welfare states 
since their very inception: however, a growing and increasingly ageing population has placed the 
framework for the delivery of these services under significant pressure, thus prompting important 
questions as to the sustainability of their current mode of provision.  In this context, the role of 
private undertakings, acting on a commercial basis both alongside and instead of public agencies has 
emerged as a feature in many member states.  At the same time, it has prompted pressing questions 
as to what extent it may be compatible with the mutuality-based nature of these services, typical of 
the tradition of many member states, including the United Kingdom.  In this context, the impact of 
European integration and the realisation of the single market has been significant and has 
sometimes added to the perception that due to the influence of the free movement, competition 
and public procurement rules existing within the EU legal system safeguarding the solidarity 
rationale characterising these services may become more and more difficult.   
       A push toward increasingly integrated global markets beyond the EU, via the Union's proactive 
stance in the field of international trade, has contributed to these concerns.  This paper has analysed 
a number of issues arising from the interplay between the realisation of the internal market within 
the EU and the discretionary powers of the member states as regards the regulation of the provision 
of publicly funded healthcare services.  It was argued that while in principle these constitute 
"services" within the meaning of the TFEU and are consequently subject to the free movement rules, 
the concern that, as a result of the application of these and of other "market-oriented" principles, 
they may be heading toward a "privatization by stealth" are more apparent than real.   
           The forgoing analysis touched upon the nature and scope of the competences that the EU and 
the member states enjoy in this field: it was shown that while these services, even when they are 
                                                          
145 See the letter sent to John Healey MP (Chair, All Party Parliamentary Group on TTIP) by Ignacio Garcia-
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publicly funded, remain subject to the single market rules, Member States enjoy significant 
discretion for constructing legal justifications at the basis of limits to the reach of the free movement 
requirements in this area.  The EU, on its part, only enjoys a narrow power in this field, which is 
limited to "supporting and coordinating" the Member States' action so that the exercise of their 
"sovereignty" over healthcare systems does not hamper the good functioning of the internal market.  
A similarly subsidiarity-based approach seems also to underscore the way in which the award of 
public contracts can occur for healthcare services: it may be suggested that the light touch regime 
affecting the award of such contracts would allow the awarding bodies to apply criteria for the 
selection of winning bids that are based on, inter alia, “geographic proximity” of providers to users 
of services or generally on non-economic considerations. 
          The provision of publicly funded medical services in the United Kingdom has offered a clear 
example of how individual member states can exercise their powers in this area and thereby shape 
the reach of the competition rules, of principles of market access and free movement of services for 
the purpose of protecting the mutual nature of taxpayer-funded healthcare from the “vagaries of 
the market forces”.  It was acknowledged that the 2012 reforms in England and Wales have been 
very controversial and have resulted in significant differences vis-à-vis the functioning of the NHS in 
Scotland. However, it was argued that the Westminster and Holyrood parliaments remain 
“sovereign” over decisions in this area, in accordance with Article 168 TFEU and can therefore 
determine "how much" or "how little market" they may regard as appropriate in this sector, by 
relying both on their freedoms to choose how to design these frameworks and on the “safety 
valves” that EU and domestic law provide for this purpose. 
            Toward the end, this paper briefly addressed the concerns that had been raised in this area in 
connection with the negotiation of the EU/US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: it was 
argued that just as with the adoption of internal measures, the action of the Union on the 
international plain remains subject to the general principle of conferral: consequently, it was 
suggested that short of amending Article 168 TFEU to widen its powers in this field, the EU would 
not be empowered to act in a way that de facto alters the boundaries of its powers and thereby  
seek to engender convergence among the varying approaches adopted by each member state in 
regulating the functioning of and the access to taxpayer-funded healthcare around more market-
based principles. 
           In light of the forgoing, it may be concluded that while continuing to provide state funded 
medical services "free at the point of need" remains a challenge for all member states and must be 
pursued in accordance with the broader principles and goals enshrined in the TFEU, the Treaty itself 
safeguards the domestic powers of appreciation in this area, through the general principles of 
conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.  Consequently, while it is acknowledged that the 
presence of private providers in this sector may become more commonplace in the future, it will be 
entirely incumbent on the member states to decide whether and in what measure to "open up" 
taxpayer-funded healthcare to competition.  The EU, on its part, is only empowered to enact 
measures designed to avoid that state measures do not unduly impair the functioning of the internal 
market: however, it cannot, unless the Treaty was amended to this effect, hasten or more generally 
influence the direction of travel or the speed of this clearly national process.  
 
